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Casenotes
TRANSFER OF STOCK ON BOOKS OF CORPORATION
IS SUFFICIENT FOR GIFT INTER VIVOS
Allender v. Allender1
On August 8, 1952, the decedent, Mr. Allender, a widower with four children, married a widow with one child.
He was Secretary-Treasurer and manager of the Key Grain
and Feed Company and owned 369 shares of its outstanding
stock. In 1946 he had directed the Manchester Bank to add
the names of two of his sons to the registry of access to his
safe deposit boxes; however, neither of his sons knew of
this nor had a key until after their father's death. On
December 22, 1948, the decedent had made a will, but did
not have it witnessed and the Orphans' Court refused to
probate it. The will contained no clause respecting the stock
holdings. On January 19, 1949, the decedent had surrendered his then held stock certificates and, in exchange,
received four new stock certificates, each entered in his own
name and one of his children as joint tenants with right of
survivorship. He had previously transferred 137 shares of
Detour Bank stock to himself and his wife "by the entireties". All of the shares of stock were recorded on the books
of the respective companies and all stocks were placed in
the safe deposit box at the Manchester Bank on January
19, 1949. At all times, the decedent voted the shares of
stock himself and received all the dividends and no one
except the bookkeeper and the president of the Key Grain
Company knew of the transfer of stock, the new certificates
having been signed at the home of the president. The decedent ran the business and, on one occasion, purchased property for the company without the permission of the president or the board of directors. The widow sued to set aside
the transfer of the shares of stock and the lower court gave
verdict in her favor. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the gift of stock was valid.
The first question considered by the Court of Appeals
was whether there was a sufficient transfer of the donor's
interest by the surrender of the old shares of stock and the
issuance of the new stock to the parties as joint tenants,
1199 Md. 541, 87 A. 2d 608 (1952).
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the transfer of stock being properly recorded on the books
of the corporation. The court held such a transfer of the
stock indicates an intent to completely abolish all the rights
and obligations of the original holder and to create new
rights and obligations in the transferee. Prior to this decision, the court had held that a transfer was not complete
until made on the books of the company.2 The court found
nothing in the Uniform Stock Transfer Act 3 to negate this
principle, and stated that the effect of the Act is to make
the certificate negotiable, not to cast doubt on the validity
of the transfer made on the books of the corporation. Such
transfer constitutes an irrevocable act on the part of the
donor, sufficient to give the new joint owners immediate
interests, irrevocable without their consent.
The Court considered the appellee's contention that the
retention by the donor of the voting power of the stock and
the collection of the dividends intimated that there was no
valid intent to completely part with the shares of stock.
Recognizing that if the transferor had retained complete
dominion and control over the stock and the right to revoke
the transfer there could not be a valid gift, the court found
no such intent in the donor and the fact that he improperly
voted the stock and collected the dividends was merely a
limitation on the quality of the gift and did not affect its
validity.'
The Court found no difficulty with the fact that the
donees knew nothing of the transfer, but held that acceptance would be presumed. No prior Court of Appeals decision had applied the presumption to a case involving
stock transfer, but Mr. Machen in his work on Corporations
mentions that the acceptance is presumed from the beneficial character of the gift, unless there is definite proof to
the contrary.5 Machen also points out that it might be
considered as a unilateral conveyance which is complete
upon registration without the necessity of any acceptance.
Brown on Personal Property notes the theory that some
hold that it is a bilateral contract with a rebutable presumption of acceptance.6 Regardless of the particular reaBaltimore Retort and Fire Brick Co. v. Mali, 65 Md. 93, 96, 3 A. 286

(1886).
8

Md. Code (1939), Art. 23, Sec. 55, et seq., now Md. Code (1951), Sec.
96, et seq.
4Grissom v. Sternberger, 10 F. 2d 764, 767 (4th Cir., 1926). See also
Farmer v. Loyola College, 166 Md. 455, 463, 171 A. 361 (1934) ; 157 A. L. R.
1184, 1189.
'I
MACHEN, A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF CORPORATIONS (1908),
Sec.
872.
6
BRowN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY (1936), Sec. 50.
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soning which one might prefer, the result remains the same
and is accepted. A Georgia case confirms this view,' and
the highest court of Pennsylvania has clearly ruled that the
donee's knowledge of the transaction before the death of
the donor is not essential to a valid gift inter vivos, since
there is a presumption that a person will accept what is for
his benefit and by subsequent actual acceptance, the donee
ratifies the original delivery by which the gift was made.8
Now Maryland has expressly stated that the presumption is
also applicable to cases involving a transfer of the shares
of stock of a company.
Thus in the instant case, the necessary elements of a
gift (delivery, intent to give, and acceptance) 9 were found:
the acceptance was presumed; a constructive delivery had
been obtained from a consideration of the circumstances of
the delivery of the stock certificates to the bank and the
placing of them in a safe deposit box, after the transfer
had been recorded on the books of the corporation; and the
intent was apparent from these acts of the donor plus all
of the surrounding circumstances. The Court reasoned that
the donor had parted with all effective control of the stock;"
and that the possession of one co-tenant was in contemplation of law the possession of the other so that the holding
of the stock by the decedent as one of the joint tenants was
sufficient."
The Court seems to have properly recognized that the
determining factor of the gift was the intent of the decedent
Cannon v. Williams, 194 Ga. 808, 22 S. E. 2d 838, 844 (1942).
8 In re Rynier's Estate, 347 Pa. 471, 32 A. 2d 736, 738 (1943).

9BRowN, op. cit., 8upra, n. 6, See. 37. For good articles discussing the
general problem of gifts of choses in action and the relative importance of
the several elements see: Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of
Chattels and of Choses in Action evidenced by Commercial Instrumnts, 21
Ill. L. Rev. 341, 457, 568 (1926-27) ; Bruton, The Requirement of Delivery
as Applied to Gifts of Choses in Action, 39 Yale L. J. 837 (1930) ; Williston,
Gifts of Rights under Contracts in Writing by Delivery of the Writing, 40
Yale L. J. 1 (1930) ; Modesitt, Application of the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act to Gifts of Stock, 20 Rocky Mountain L. Rev. 67 (1947) ; BROWN, 100.
cit., supra, n. 6; Sykes Inter Vivos Transfers in Violation of the Rights of
Surviving Spouses, 10 Md. L. Rev. 1 (1949).
"oCompare to Getchell v. Biddleford Say. Bank, 94 Me. 452, 47 A. 895
(1900), where the husband, a bank official, transferred some shares of stock
and a bank account to his wife, without her knowledge, and it was he who
drew the dividends and issued receipts for them in his own name. After his
wife's death, he persuaded the other bank officials to transfer both the
stock and the bank account to him. It was not until after his death that
this affair was discovered. Held, the wife's estate was not entitled to the
stock.
u Young v. Cockman, 182 Md. 246, 251, 34 A. 2d 428 (1943).
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husband. 2 From the facts of the case, there appeared to
be a clear intent of the father to pass the shares of stock
to his own children and thus exclude his wife and her child,
as he had already provided for her and he wished to leave
his interest in the company to his children. This intent the
father could validly accomplish, without defrauding the
wife of her marital rights (as she claimed was the case)
as long as he effectively carried out his intent by sufficiently
relinquishing dominion and control during his lifetime.'3
The Court of Appeals found that this had been done.

LIABILITY OF MASTER TO GUEST
IN SALESMAN'S AUTOMOBILE
Wood v. H. W. Gossard Co.'
This was a personal injury action brought by a guest
of the defendant's saleswoman arising out of an automobile
collision.
Defendant was a seller of ladies' foundation garments
and had participated in a sales meeting, "Corset Market
Week", in New York. There the saleswoman and defendant's executives made a concentrated effort to have plaintiff, a buyer for a Richmond Department store, adopt a new
line of defendant's merchandise, a light-weight model called
"Old Gold". Plaintiff was still uncertain at the end of the
week, but she had stayed over an extra day in New York
to inspect the new line, at the urgings of the saleswoman,
and relinquished airplane accommodations to Baltimore
upon the saleswoman's promise to drive plaintiff to Baltimore. The saleswoman, as a regional representative, was required to have a car to cover her territory, for which the
company had loaned her the purchase price. It was part of
the saleswoman's job to attend Corset Market Week in New
IsNew York takes the lead in the newer view in relaxing the requirements
of the older ideas of delivery and acceptance where a clear cut intent can
be found from a contemplation of the facts involved. In re Cohn, 187 App.
Div. 392, 176 N. Y. Supp. 225 (1919). In a case involving the estate of the
late President Roosevelt, the New York Court went to great lengths in
carrying out his wishes regarding the distribution of his papers, even
though only partial delivery had been made. In re Roosevelt's Will, 190
Misc. Rep. 341, 73 N. Y. Supp. 2d 821 (1947).
I Allender v. Allender, 199 Md. 541, 550, 87 A. 2d, 608 (1952). See also
Note, 157 A. L. R. 1184, 1189; Sykes, Inter Vivos Transfers in Violation of
the Rights of Surviving Spouses, loo. cit., supra, n. 9; Katzenstein, Joint
Savings Bank Accounts in Maryland, 3 Md. L. Rev. 109, 110-114 (1939).
1204 Md. 177, 103 A. 2d 130 (1954).

